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Motor vehicles are among the most dangerous products sold anywhere. Automobiles pose a larger risk of acci-dental death than any other product, except perhaps opioids. Annual auto-crash deaths in the United States have not been below 30,000 since the 
1940s, reaching a recent peak of roughly 40,000 in 2016. 
And the social cost of auto crashes goes beyond deaths. Auto-
accident victims who survive often incur extraordinary medical 
expenses. Those crash victims whose injuries render them unable 
to work experience lost income. Auto accidents also cause non-
trivial amounts of property damage—mostly to the automobiles 
themselves, but also to highways, bridges, or other elements of 
the transportation infrastructure. Finally, serious motor vehicle 
accidents often cause severe noneconomic injuries—that is, “pain 
and suffering.” According to some estimates, such noneconomic 
harms amount to more than twice the magnitude of the aggregate 
economic damages caused by auto accidents.
All of this may be about to change. According to many auto-
industry experts, the eventual transition to driverless vehicles 
will drastically lower the economic and noneconomic costs of 
auto accidents. 
Why might this be so? Humans are bad drivers. People have 
bad judgment, slow reflexes, inadequate skills, and short atten-
tion spans. They drive too fast. They drive while intoxicated or 
sleepy or distracted. According to the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, roughly 94% of auto accidents today are 
attributable to “driver error.” 
The hope is that computers can do better. Fully driverless 
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Automaker enterprise liability would have useful incentives that 
driver liability law misses.
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vehicles, sometimes referred to within the industry as “Level 5s” 
to distinguish them from vehicles with levels of partial autonomy, 
would not suffer from the problems that plague human decision-
making in the driving context. These vehicles thus promise to be 
substantially safer than the human-driven alternative. 
How should the automobile tort/insurance regime be rede-
signed to take into account the emergence of driverless vehicles? 
I propose to replace our current auto tort regime (including auto 
products liability law, driver-based negligence claims, and auto no-
fault regimes) with a single comprehensive automaker enterprise 
liability system. This new regime would apply not only to Level 5s, 
but to all automobiles made and sold to be driven on public roads. 
My basic argument is that while current negligence-based auto 
liability rules could in theory work to provide optimal accident-
avoidance incentives, in practice they do not. The current system 
requires courts and drivers to evaluate benefit–cost tradeoffs 
they are not equipped to make. Also under the current system, 
much of auto-accident costs are offloaded onto medical and dis-
ability insurers or taxpayers. By contrast, under an automaker 
enterprise liability system, responsibility for those costs would 
be placed on the parties in the best position to reduce and insure 
them: vehicle manufacturers. In addition, automakers would be 
induced to charge enough for cars to fully internalize the costs of 
automobile accidents. Further, if auto-insurance contracts—and 
auto-insurance premium adjustments—could be deployed to 
improve driving habits, auto manufacturers would be induced to 
coordinate with auto insurers to achieve these deterrence gains. 
Moreover, to the extent that Level 5s reduce the cost of accidents, 
they would be cheaper to purchase than conventional vehicles, 
which would provide a natural subsidy to encourage (and poten-
tially accelerate) their deployment. 
EVALUATING THE DETERRENCE IMPLICATIONS 
OF CURRENT AUTO TORT LAW
Existing automaker liability law is primarily a negligence-based 
regime. Under current law in most U.S. jurisdictions, individu-
als who suffer harm caused in an automobile crash can recover 
from the automaker in tort if they can prove that the harm 
resulted from negligence (or a lack of reasonable care) on the 
part of the automaker in designing or constructing the vehicle. 
Alternatively, auto accident victims can invoke modern product 
liability doctrine and argue that a “defect” in the vehicle’s design, 
manufacturing process, or warnings caused the harm. And in 
most jurisdictions, the definition of a product defect likewise 
requires a showing of negligence.
A negligence-based liability rule would induce automakers 
to take efficient care, provided the following two assumptions 
are true:
■■ Automakers are aware of the law and respond rationally to it.
■■ Courts perform a thorough and accurate benefit–cost
analysis in their determinations regarding what constitutes
automaker negligence or what counts as a design defect.
Under those assumptions, the negligence-based regime would 
incentivize efficient automaker care levels—i.e., investments in 
crash–risk reduction—because automakers would avoid negli-
gence-based liability if they make all cost-justified design and 
warning changes.
A negligence-based automaker liability regime can also cre-
ate incentives for efficient driver care-levels. A negligence-based 
regime would leave accident costs on victims and their insurers 
if the automaker is not negligent. That would induce drivers to 
drive carefully so as to minimize their own risk of uncompen-
sated accident losses. Thus, an efficiently and accurately applied 
negligence-based automaker liability rule can produce efficient 
incentives for both automakers and drivers to take care to avoid 
auto accidents. 
There are obvious problems with this rosy picture, however. 
First, consider the effects on automaker care levels if we relax 
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standards. If judges and juries are not very good at doing the 
complex and information-intensive analysis, the outcomes of 
courts’ negligence determinations become highly uncertain. This 
can produce incentives for automakers to both over-invest and 
under-invest in auto safety. The incentive to over-invest can arise 
when manufacturers expect courts to set the standard of rea-
sonable care (or a non-defective design) inefficiently high. The 
incentive to under-invest can arise if courts rely too much on 
custom within the industry as their source for what constitutes 
reasonable care because industry custom can lag what is a truly 
efficient level of safety. 
A second problem with a negligence-based auto products 
liability regime has to do with driver care levels. For a negligence-
based regime to efficiently incentivize drivers to drive carefully, the 
tort system must impose on drivers the risk of accidents that are 
not cost-justifiably preventable by the manufacturer. But drivers 
simply are not aware of the tort law rules that apply to them or the 
product liability rules that apply to automakers. Moreover, even 
when drivers do know about accident risks and legal rules, they 
may not respond rationally to that information or may externalize 
those risks to insurance companies. Because of these facts, the 
ability of a negligence-based auto products liability regime to 
optimize driver care levels is substantially undermined. Legally 
imposing costs on drivers would not—or at least may not—have 
the desired deterrence effect on driver care levels.
The final deterrence problem with a negligence-based auto 
products liability regime would exist even if judges and juries were 
good (accurate and unbiased) at applying benefit–cost standards. 
In fact, this problem results because automakers would expect 
accurate application of the negligence-based rules. The problem 
involves the effect of a negligence-based automaker liability rule 
on the number of vehicles sold or, in the language of deterrence, 
the effect on automaker “activity levels.” Even an efficiently safe 
car (one with no defects whatsoever) that is driven carefully by its 
human or algorithmic driver poses some residual risk of crashing. 
This residual risk will tend to be ignored or externalized by auto-
makers under a negligence-based product liability regime because 
automakers are not liable for them under a negligence liability 
standard. The result is that the number of cars sold may be higher 
than the social-welfare-maximizing level, even ignoring the effect 
of automobile emissions on the environment, because the price of 
vehicles does not include this cost of unpreventable auto accidents. 
To summarize, under our current negligence-based automaker 
liability regime, there are reasons to be concerned that automaker 
and driver care levels may be too low and activity levels too high. 
Driver liability law / In a majority of U.S. states, if someone is 
injured or suffers property damage as a result of a driver’s neg-
ligent operation of an automobile rather than as a result of 
automaker negligence, the victim may recover from the negligent 
driver under standard common-law principles of tort. The vic-
tim must demonstrate that the harm to her was a result of the 
driver’s failure to do something that a reasonable driver would 
have done under the circumstances, or the driver’s doing some-
thing that a reasonable driver under the circumstances would 
not have done. 
Negligence-based driver liability law can have beneficial deter-
rence effects on driver care levels (that is, how safely people drive) 
if we make the following assumptions:
■■ Drivers are well informed about accident risks (and how
their behavioral changes affect those accident risks).
■■ Drivers are well-informed about the rules of tort law.
■■ Drivers internalize those risks (rather than externalize them
to insurers, for example).
■■ Drivers process the information about those risks rationally
(without any systematic cognitive biases).
■■ Courts are good at applying benefit-cost-type negligence-
based liability rules.
If all of these assumptions are true, drivers would have adequate 
incentive to drive with efficient care in terms of driving speed, 
safe braking and passing practices, smart-phone usage (or non-
usage), and the like. This is so because, by taking efficient care 
in driving, drivers would avoid liability for the accidents that 
nevertheless occur. 
The assumptions listed above almost certainly do not hold in 
the real world. While drivers may be generally aware of the broad 
outlines of the driver liability regime in their state (whether it is 
fault-based or no-fault), they likely do not understand what the 
precise implications of that fact are on their chances of being 
found liable in court for unsafe driving. What’s more, the aver-
age driver, while generally and vaguely cognizant of the risks of 
driving, is almost certainly uneducated about the precise levels 
of risk associated with various aspects of driving—for example, 
precisely how much the chance of a crash is increased by texting 
while driving or changing lanes abruptly with no signal. In fact, 
there is a good chance that most drivers underestimate those risks. 
Thus, a negligence-based driver liability regime, which relies on 
assumptions of informed and rational drivers to produce optimal 
driver care levels, may not produce the deterrence benefits that 
are predicted by deterrence theory.
How is this pessimistic picture of driver liability law as a system 
of incentivizing good driving changed by the presence of auto 
insurance? The answer is complicated. On one hand, automobile 
insurance has the potential to correct some of these deterrence-
related problems. Auto insurers are, unlike most drivers, extremely 
well-informed about the intricacies of accident law. They employ 
teams of lawyers whose job is to understand how driver liability 
laws in each state affect the liability risks of their customers. 
Indeed, their profitability and their survival as going concerns 
depend on this expert understanding of the auto liability laws of 
all sorts. In addition, auto insurers have unparalleled access to 
enormous amounts of detailed information regarding the crash-
risk characteristics of millions of drivers and automobiles. This 
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is the result of decades of experience providing auto insurance 
coverage to hundreds of millions of drivers and vehicles, which 
in turn means pricing millions of auto insurance policies and 
adjusting millions of auto-crash claims over the years. No other 
institution or organization has the same amount of driver-specific 
and automobile-specific data as the auto insurance industry. 
In addition, recent innovations in “telematics” (which com-
bines telecommunications, data science, and automotive technol-
ogy) have increased auto insurers’ ability to gather and analyze 
risk-relevant driver and vehicle data. With this new and emerg-
ing technology, not only do insurers have access to information 
regarding how drivers’ past auto-claims and traffic-ticket histories 
affect their riskiness as drivers, they also have the ability to gather 
information on the effects of a range of specific driving behaviors 
on auto-crash risks. For example, a number of insurers currently 
gather information about drivers’ braking, acceleration, speed-
ing, turning, and cornering behaviors. Once these driver-specific 
data are combined with data gathered by insurers and others 
(including NHTSA) about what factors cause auto accidents 
generally, it becomes possible for auto insurers to link specific 
driving behaviors of particular drivers with premium discounts.
All of this information is to varying degrees already being taken 
into account by many auto insurance companies in the pricing of 
their insurance policies. For example, policy discounts are offered 
to drivers with good safety records as well as for vehicles with 
particular safety features. In addition, insurers are now offering 
discounts if drivers will improve their driving ability—for example, 
if they will take defensive driving classes. Because of the telemat-
ics revolution, auto insurers are even able to adjust premiums 
on the basis of the specific driving behavior of individual drivers. 
For example, some insurers give discounts for a range of driver-
care-level factors such as wearing seatbelts, driving at moderate 
speeds, limiting late night trips, and avoiding aggressive braking. 
Also, the advances in telematics have made “pay as you go” auto 
insurance, under which premiums are a function of the number 
of miles driven, more accurate—and thus more prevalent—than 
ever before. Driving-behavior-sensitive auto insurance premiums—
which take into account both good and bad driving choices (i.e., 
driver care levels) and, critically, the number of miles driven (i.e., 
driver activity levels)—would incentivize risk-reducing driving 
behavior more than even the most sophisticated government 
regulator could hope to do.
But here is the problem: under current law and existing market 
conditions, auto insurers do not have strong incentives to make 
full use of their comparative advantage at gathering risk-relevant 
information and pricing their insurance on the basis of that infor-
mation. The reason is that the amount of coverage currently being 
provided by auto insurers represents only a fraction (in many cases 
a small fraction) of the total risks of auto crashes. This is true of 
first-party auto insurance coverage, which tends to cover only a 
fraction of the accident risks that any driver faces. It is also true of 
auto liability coverage because the mandatory minimum amounts 
in most states are far less than the maximum harm threatened by 
an auto accident that results in even one serious injury or death. 
As a result, many of the costs of auto accidents are currently 
being externalized to non-auto first-party health and disability 
insurers who—unlike auto insurers in the telematics age—do not 
tailor premiums at all based on their insureds’ driving decisions. 
(To the extent such coverage is provided through government 
programs funded by tax dollars, there is obviously no premium 
being charged at all.) Thus, even to the extent that auto insurers 
do attempt to charge individualized, behavior- and risk-adjusted 
auto insurance rates (which, as I noted above, they are increas-
ingly trying to do), this incentive is undermined by the fact that 
auto insurers cover only a fraction of the risks of auto accidents. 
There are important ways, however, in which the allocation of 
auto-accident risks to non-auto first-party insurers has cost-reduc-
ing advantages. This may seem incongruous with the argument in 
the previous paragraph, but it is not. While auto insurers are in 
a good position, through premium discounts, to help optimize 
driver care and activity levels, auto insurers are not necessarily in 
a good position to minimize some other costs associated with 
providing insurance benefits. For example, primary health care 
coverage provided through auto insurance companies is almost 
certainly much more expensive than primary health care provided 
through regular non-auto, first-party health insurers. Although 
auto insurers, in a sense, specialize increasingly in reducing driver 
ex-ante moral hazard, it is non-auto health insurance companies 
who specialize in reducing ex-post medical moral hazard—that is, 
excessive or wasteful use of the health care system. My point here 
is only that the current division of auto-accident costs, allocating 
so little to auto insurers, may be non-optimal given auto insurers’ 
potential ability to incentivize better (and less) driving.
To summarize, because of drivers’ lack of accident-risk infor-
mation and understanding of auto tort law and their suscepti-
bility to cognitive biases, and because of the presence of cost-
externalizing private and public insurance coverage for auto-crash 
risks, there is reason to doubt that the current negligence-based 
auto tort laws—automaker liability laws as well as driver liability 
laws—work to optimize driver care and activity levels. 
THE AUTOMAKER ENTERPRISE 
LIABILITY ALTERNATIVE 
As an alternative to our current negligence-based auto tort regime, 
consider the possibility of a comprehensive automaker enterprise 
liability regime. Under such a regime, anyone who suffers a physi-
cal injury or property damage in an automobile accident would be 
entitled to recover compensation for the losses sustained as result 
of the accident from the manufacturer of the vehicle. Accident 
victims would not be required to show negligence on the part of 
the manufacturer. Nor would they have to prove that the auto-
mobiles, or any of the warnings or instructions accompanying the 
automobiles, are in any way defective or unreasonably dangerous. 
Crash victims would need to prove only that the harms for which 
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they seek compensation “arose out of the use of” a vehicle that was 
designed and built by the manufacturer from whom compensa-
tion is sought. Each automaker would be financially responsible 
for the losses resulting from any crash arising out of the use of 
that automaker’s vehicles. 
Liability under an enterprise liability regime, however, would 
not necessarily be limited to auto manufacturers. Liability could 
also be extended to a range of other enterprises that fall within 
the design, production, sale, and distribution chain of any given 
vehicle. The allocation of responsibility among those enterprises, 
however, would presumably be determined by contracts among 
the various counter-parties. Those contracts should be enforced 
so long as the cost of auto accidents is not allocated to parties 
who are insolvent or judgment-proof.
The types and amount of compensation recoverable under an 
automaker enterprise liability regime would probably be limited 
to economic losses—medical expenses, lost income, and property 
damage. The dearth of pain-and-suffering insurance observed 
in the marketplace could suggest that limiting compensation to 
economic losses would be consistent with consumer preferences. 
And, in any event, not providing compensation for noneconomic 
harms is a common and reasonable political compromise for 
alternative compensation regimes. 
The compensation regime I am imagining is a comprehensive 
automaker enterprise liability regime. In other words, it would 
apply to all automobiles sold after the effective date of the enact-
ing legislation, whether driven by humans, computer algorithms, 
or any combination of the two. One result of the adoption of a 
comprehensive automaker enterprise liability regime would be 
an increase in the price of most newly purchased automobiles 
relative to vehicles purchased before the effective date of the 
enacting legislation. This would happen because the cost of auto 
accidents that had been hidden in non-auto first-party medical 
insurance coverage prior to the enterprise liability regime would 
be brought into the open through increases in automobile and 
auto-insurance prices. 
Theoretical deterrence benefits / Under a comprehensive auto-
maker enterprise liability regime, because automakers would 
be responsible for all of the economic costs of auto accidents 
associated with their vehicles, they would be forced to internal-
ize those costs. As a result, there would be beneficial deterrence 
consequences for automaker and, potentially, driver care and 
activity levels. 
First and most obviously, automakers would have a strong legal 
and financial incentive to develop and implement cost-justified 
auto-safety innovations, whatever those might be. That is, if an 
automaker determined that there was some new brake design 
(such as a new computer-assisted automatic braking system) or 
some new guided cruise control mechanism that would reduce 
overall accident costs relative to its costs of development and 
implementation, then enterprise liability would reward them for 
implementing those innovations and punish them for not doing 
so. In addition, there would be no incentive to stick with existing 
industry customs or consumer expectations if such customs or 
expectations were lagging behind proven safety innovations. And 
there would be no incentive to over-invest in safety features that 
are likely to impress a court or jury in a negligence-based lawsuit 
(such as a design defect lawsuit) but that, in actuality, provide 
less additional accident-risk reduction than they cost to produce.
Second, enterprise liability would force the price of automo-
biles to reflect the full expected costs of auto accidents. That 
cost internalization, in turn, could result in a scale of automo-
tive manufacturing and sales that would be closer to the social 
optimum than is currently the case because drivers would—in 
deciding whether to purchase a vehicle—be more likely to consider 
something closer to the full social costs of that decision. In other 
words, auto enterprise liability could push us in the direction 
of optimal manufacturer activity levels—the optimal number of 
vehicles being sold. If that were to happen, it would be a clear 
improvement—in terms of overall efficiency—over the existing 
negligence-based automaker liability regime.
What would the implications of auto enterprise liability be for 
fully driverless vehicles? If Level 5s have lower expected accident 
costs relative to human-driven vehicles, then they would also have 
a substantially lower enterprise liability “tax” relative to human-
driven vehicles (including perhaps partially driverless vehicles) 
made and produced after the new regime is adopted. Thus, the 
adoption of a comprehensive automaker liability regime would, 
under present assumptions, strongly incentivize and reward 
auto manufacturers to proceed, as quickly as is feasible, with the 
development and distribution of Level 5s. 
If an enterprise liability regime is likely to have deterrence 
benefits on the automaker side, what about its deterrence effects 
on driver behavior? First, enterprise liability would create strong 
legal and financial incentives for automakers to develop and adopt 
the most cost-effective ways of warning drivers about crash risks 
and of instructing drivers about how best to avoid certain types of 
accidents. This effect flows from the fact that enterprise liability 
makes automakers responsible for all of the economic costs of 
their vehicles’ accidents. If an automaker could actually reduce 
the frequency or severity of accidents in its vehicles by altering 
the wording, design, or placement of warnings or instructions, 
it would have an incentive to do so. On the other hand, if some 
new or revised warning would be more likely to confuse or annoy 
drivers than to educate them, the automaker would be incentiv-
ized under enterprise liability not to add that sort of unhelpful 
warning—even if it would have gotten the automaker “off the 
hook” under a more traditional negligence-based warning-defect 
standard. Automakers would do whatever works best to reduce 
accident costs. Thus, in the transition to Level 5s, automakers 
would be incentivized to warn and instruct optimally regarding 
both the risks and the appropriate uses of intermediate driverless 
technology such as guided cruise control.
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In addition, enterprise liability could incentivize automak-
ers to restructure the ways that automobiles are insured and 
sold in order to improve driver care and activity levels. Under an 
enterprise-liability regime, automakers would have an incentive to 
shift contractually much of the expected costs of auto accidents 
to auto insurers. This somewhat counterintuitive result flows 
from the fact that auto insurers have a comparative advantage 
with respect to monitoring and regulating driver care and activity 
levels. If automakers could get auto insurers to take on somewhat 
more of the risk of auto accidents, the insurers would have a 
strong incentive to help drivers reduce expected accident costs. 
That is, because of competition for customers in the insurance 
industry, auto insurers would be incentivized to use the tools 
at their disposal—including individualized, driving-behavior-
sensitive, risk-adjusted insurance premiums—in ways that would 
tend to encourage better driving habits and perhaps less driving, 
especially by high-risk drivers. 
What does this mean for how auto insurance would be sold? 
Auto insurance under an enterprise liability regime might be 
sold in the same way it is today. An individual auto purchaser, in 
other words, might pay the automaker for the vehicle itself and 
then purchase a separate auto insurance policy at the same time 
from a separate auto insurance company. However, given that 
automakers ultimately would be responsible legally for the auto-
accident losses paid by the auto insurers, there would be strong 
incentives for contractual coordination between automakers 
and auto insurers. Individual auto manufacturers might even be 
induced to partner with particular auto insurers in an effort to 
offer the best, most competitively priced combined product of 
vehicle and vehicle-insurance coverage. 
Another way that enterprise liability could improve driver 
care and activity levels is through its effect on how automobiles 
are sold. For example, the introduction of an enterprise liability 
regime might push the automotive industry in the direction 
of lease transactions rather than outright sales because leasing 
would make it easier for automakers to enforce the terms of the 
auto insurance policies sold by an insurer that is contractually 
partnered with the automaker. Under a lease arrangement, for 
example, if a driver became uninsurable (because of bad driving 
behavior and/or increased claim payouts) or if the driver simply 
stopped paying her premiums, there might be a provision in the 
lease empowering the automaker to reclaim the vehicle. 
In addition to favoring leasehold arrangements, the introduc-
tion of enterprise liability might create market pressure on auto 
manufacturers to sell vehicles to commercial purchasers rather 
than individual consumers. These commercial purchasers, in turn, 
would either lease the vehicles to individual drivers or perhaps 
make them available through ride-share arrangements. Automak-
ers would be incentivized to choose commercial purchasers who 
are financially responsible and would be incentivized to purchase 
efficient auto insurance contracts to cover the enterprise liability 
payouts. Such a trend toward commercial fleets would be con-
sistent with already existing market trends toward ride-sharing 
companies. 
I am not suggesting that comprehensive automaker enterprise 
liability would necessarily result in auto-lease arrangements 
replacing individual sales or ride-sharing replacing driving. Rather, 
once automakers are made legally responsible for the cost of auto 
accidents (or for most of those costs), they will have an incentive 
(and the ability) to structure automobile distribution markets in 
ways that are more efficient.
CAVEATS, CONCERNS, AND CONCLUSIONS
This description of an automaker enterprise liability regime is 
only a rough outline of an idea, a jumping-off point for further 
discussion. The actual design of such a program would require 
empirical research into a range of topics, including whether shift-
ing to enterprise liability would actually, and not just theoreti-
cally, produce substantial deterrence benefits.
Among the questions to be answered would be these: 
■■ Under any real-world version of an automaker enterprise
liability regime, how long would automakers’ responsibility
for insuring their vehicles remain in effect? Would it be for
the useful life of the vehicle or for some period of time—say,
10 years? If for some period of time, who would be respon-
sible for covering the accidents arising out of the later use of
the vehicle?
■■ What would the precise relationship be between an auto-
maker enterprise liability regime and state mandatory
insurance/financial responsibility laws? Presumably, rescis-
sion of coverage by the insurer because of excessive accident
experience or the failure to pay premiums would result in
a suspension of driving privileges, but how would that be
enforced?
■■ Furthermore, if an auto enterprise liability regime were
adopted, would all vehicles manufactured and sold before
a given date be exempt? Or would older vehicles made
before the new law goes into effect be transitioned into the
new regime over time? If older vehicles were fully exempted
from the new regime, how would we deal with the result-
ing potentially large price differential between new vehicles
(which would be priced with full accident costs internalized
into the purchase price) and used vehicles (which would not
be)? What role could increased mandatory minimum levels
of auto insurance play in assisting with that transition?
■■ In addition, given that the transition to an automaker enter-
prise liability regime would almost certainly increase the
“experienced” price of autos and driving, how would low-
income families be expected to afford access to auto owner-
ship, which has been shown to foster upward mobility?
All of these are fair questions and would need to be considered 
before auto enterprise liability were seriously considered.
